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Abstract
Advertisements provide consumers with knowledge about private prod-
ucts, whereas political information is required to provide voters with knowl-
edge of public issues. Modern information technologies and globalisation
are increasing the exposure of individuals to information. Goods advertis-
ing is competing with political information for people’s attention. This pa-
per presents a politico-economic equilibrium model in which the tension be-
tween private and public agendas can be analysed. It is shown that in an
information-rich society, international goods market integration tends to re-
duce the quality of public policy. Complementing economic integration with
political integration can increase the gains from globalisation, though not in
all cases.
Keywords: Globalisation, agenda-setting, information-rich societies, scarcity
of attention, advertising.
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21 Introduction
What is the talk of the town, or rather what is the talk of the “global village”? The
things we want to have? Or the political topics that are occupying the media? This
paper presents a politico-economic equilibrium model in which private and public
goods compete for the attention of consumers and voters.
We are used to thinking of politics and economics as separate spheres of society.
Producers and consumers meet in the marketplace, but policy happens elsewhere –
in the agora, at the ballot box and in parliament. However, economic products and
political issues meet each other in the space where information competes for peo-
ple’s attention. In an information-rich society, where attention is a scarce resource
(Simon, 1971), this leads to a new relationship between politics and economics. For
instance, some observers have suggested that commercial information is crowding
out political information: in the traditional marketplace, individuals come together
to deal both with economic goods and politics, but the public spaces in modern
cities are flooded by advertisements and the shopping mall has taken over from the
forum.
Obviously, it is not space in the sense of a particular geographical area that is
important in the competition for attention, rather the space in which information
processing takes place - the media through which information is distributed and
each individual’s brain. Attention psychology teaches us that an individual’s ca-
pacity of perception is limited.1 But maybe even more important is the fact that
– despite the quasi-unbounded media of mass communication – the effective use of
1Kahneman (1973). For a survey of the psychological literature on attention, see Pashler (1998).
3information is highly concentrated. A salient proof of this fact is provided by the
“laws of the Web”(Huberman, 2001), which indicate that user attention focuses on
a quite limited set of items. This paper accounts for the reality of limited attention
by imposing an upper bound on the sum of pieces of information (about different
private products and public issues) that can be processed by an individual.
Globalisation is usually seen as an example of market integration. Lower transporta-
tion costs and the reduction of other trade barriers promote international compe-
tition and trade. In this paper, transportation costs are assumed to be zero. In
this sense, the paper reflects the “death of distance”approach to trade. This al-
lows us to focus instead on the increase in the range of information distribution.
Global information technologies allow advertisements to cross borders. Therefore,
competition for attention takes place at the international rather than the national
level. In the debate about globalisation and cultural diversity, it has been pointed
out that international goods trading affects lifestyles, world views and freedom of
choice (Cowen, 2002).2 This paper focuses on the question as to how global distri-
bution of information affects the allocation of resources between private and public
sector. Under economic integration, firms can address consumers globally with their
advertisements. Under political integration, political issues are also discussed and
decided at the global level. The crucial question is: Does it matter whether or not
economic integration is accompanied by political integration?
In order to answer this question, the paper presents a model in which individuals
are consumers and citizens who choose from the set of alternatives brought to their
2See Olivier, Thoenig and Verdier (2007) for a microfounded model for the impact of trade on
cultural identity.
4attention. In line with the informative view on advertising (Ozga, 1960 and Stigler,
1961), firms provide consumers with knowledge about consumption opportunities.
In an analogous way, policy provides voters with knowledge about alternative pub-
lic goods. As consumers, individuals spread their money optimally over the set of
products brought to their attention. As citizens, they vote on the public projects
that have been “advertised”, anticipating that they will have to finance the projects
through their tax payments. The competition between firms for consumers with lim-
ited attention has been analysed in Falkinger (forthcoming). This paper adds the
new aspect of competition for voters and describes the politico-economic equilibrium.
A comparative-static equilibrium analysis will show the tensions that may arise be-
tween the economic and the political arenas when modern information technologies
are in operation. In particular, we will see how the globalisation of information
affects the allocation of resources between the private and public sector, and which
implications this has for welfare.
By considering both economic and political integration simultaneously, the analysis
is also concerned with the question as to what is the role of economic integration
for an optimal size for states, raised by Alesina and Spolaore (1997). These authors
argue that economic integration lowers the cost of political disintegration, which
people value because of national preferences. Such considerations are ignored in
this paper. The question as to whether economic or political integration is desirable
is examined for standard preferences. People draw utility from both private and
public consumption. As regards the assessment of the virtues and defects of eco-
nomic and political integration, only their effects on the size and diversity (quality)
5of the public and the private sectors are considered to be relevant.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the model and describes the
equilibria in the public and private sectors, respectively. The general equilibrium
is analysed in Section 3. Sections 4 and 5 deal with the impact of globalisation
on the quality and diversity of policy. Both international economic integration and
international political integration are considered. Section 6 summarises the main
findings.
2 Model
The world consists of a mass R > 1 of identical individuals. The population can be
divided into subpopulations. This will allow us to address the issue of international
integration by varying the size of the consumer population that can be addressed
by firms, and the size of the voter population in the public sector. Each individual
has income y and derives utility from private and public consumption. Let X and
G be the subutilities achieved by consuming private and public goods, respectively.
Then the total utility of an individual is given by the utility function
U(X,G) = XαGβ, (1)
with α ∈ (0, 1), β = 1− α.
In the private sector, firms supply differentiated products under monopolistic com-
petition – as modelled by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). Each product is advertised to
rX ∈
(
1, R
]
consumers. rX < R means that firms have only local range, whereas if
rX = R, then they are global players. Let Mi be the set of items advertised to an
6individual i. The size of Mi, denoted by M , is identical for all i. The utility derived
from consuming quantity xs, s ∈Mi, is given by the CES index
Xi = [
∫
Mi
xρsds]
1/ρ, 0 < ρ < 1. (2)
In an analogous way, the public sector provides a variety of public goods. Each
public good is financed and consumed by a range rG ∈
(
1, R
]
of citizens. rG may
differ from rX . For instance, rG < R and rX = R describes a world in which the
public sector is organised regionally, whereas firms operate globally. In contrast,
under conditions of political integration, rG = R. Let Ii be the set of public goods
consumed by individual i. The measure of Ii, denoted by I, is identical for all i.
The utility derived from the public sector is given by
Gi = [
∫
Ii
(
qgkr
−γ
G
)ϕ
dk]1/ϕ, 0 < ϕ < 1, (3)
where gk, k ∈ Ii, is the quantity provided of public good k, measured in units
of money. q is the quality of policy. Higher quality of policy means that the same
amount of public budget generates more service for the citizen, measured in efficiency
units. q is exogenous from the point of view of individual agents, but may depend on
the available resources for political information, as will be discussed later. Parameter
γ (with 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1) represents the degree of rivalry in public consumption. To
exclude scale effects specific to public goods, full rivalry (i.e., γ = 1) is assumed
in the main analysis. This makes the public sector fully comparable to the private
sector.
7The individual budget constraint is given by the equation∫
Mi
ps xs ds+
∫
Ii
gk
rG
dk + t0 = y, (4)
where ps denotes the price of product s. gk/rG is the tax cost per voter of public
good k, and t0 is a lump-sum tax. Individuals maximise their utility by choosing xs
as a consumer and deciding about the provision of gk as a voter.
Each product variant is produced by a monopolist. The variable costs of production
are assumed to be constant and are given by c. In order to bring a private or a pub-
lic good to people’s attention, the good has to be advertised at a certain strength.
This requires spending fixed costs A per advertised item. For the moment, A is
an exogenous constant. In Section 5, we will consider the possibility that competi-
tion for attention drives up the advertising expenditure required. Firms cover the
advertising costs with the product price, which exceeds marginal production costs
because of monopolistic competition. Political advertisements are financed by the
lump-sum tax t0. Thus, if policy covers a population of size rG, and I public goods
are promoted, then
t0 = IA/rG. (5)
Limited attention is modelled in the following way. Each individual is endowed with
time τ0(> 1) for processing information. The perception of M product variants
requires M units of time. Let h ≤ 1 be the time used for processing information
about a public good on the voting agenda. Then, if I items are on the agenda,
the processing of political information requires hI units of time. h accounts for the
possibility that political issues may be more or less carefully evaluated by individuals.
8In sum, we have the attention constraint
M + hI ≤ τ0. (6)
Time h affects the citizens’ knowledge about the public goods to be provided. This
feeds back into the quality of public good provision. We account for this fact in the
simplest possible way – by assuming that q equals h.
3 Equilibrium
Each household solves the following problem:
max
xs,gk
U s.t. (2) - (4). (7)
This implies for the product variants for private consumption isoelastic demand
curves with elasticity 1
1−ρ (absolute value). (The main text focuses on the presen-
tation and explanation of the equilibrium values. The formal derivation is provided
in Appendix A.)
Given profit maximisation in monopolistic firms, the equilibrium price in the private
sector is pX = c/ρ. A firm selling x units to rX consumers earns the operating profit
rX(p− c)x. This profit must cover advertising cost A, which is required to draw the
consumers’ attention to the firm’s product variant. Hence, under conditions of free
entry, the equilibrium quantity sold to a consumer is given by
x =
A
rX
ρ
(1− ρ)c. (8)
As a voter, an individual chooses for each public good the preferred level of public
9provision according to (7). This gives us
g =
βrG(y − t0)
I
(9)
in equilibrium. 3 A share β of total disposable income (after deduction of the lump-
sum tax) is allocated to public consumption and spread uniformly over the set of
public goods.
This leaves for total spending in the private sector the amount αrX(y − t0), which,
in view of (8), implies
M =
(1− ρ)αrX(y − t0)
A
(10)
for the equilibrium diversity of private consumption. As a result, the utility derived
from the private consumption sector is equal to the following expression:
X = M
1
ρ
−1α(y − t0)ρ/c. (11)
By contrast, the utility provided by the public sector is given by4
G = I
1
ϕ
−1hβ(y − t0). (12)
In addition, both the government’s budget constraint and the attention constraint
must hold in an equilibrium. In the following analysis, we distinguish between two
different situations. In the first situation, the set of public issues is given exogenously.
In this case, the lump-sum tax t0 and the time h devoted to the processing of political
3Use (A10) from Appendix A, accounting for pG = 1/rG,Γ = β/α and α+ β = 1.
4See (A11) - (A14) for a full derivation of (10) - (12). Note that 1+Γ = 1/α and Γ/(1+Γ) = β,
and use q = h. Moreover, γ = 1 is assumed to exclude non-rivalry in public consumption.
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information adjust until the two constraints (5) and (6) are satisfied. This regime is
discussed in the next section. The second situation, considered in Section 5, assumes
that a fixed budget is reserved for expenditure on political information, that is, t0
is fixed exogenously. The time required for the processing of information about a
certain political issue is also held constant (at h = 1). In this case, the diversity of
the political agenda I adjusts in such a way that constraints (5) and (6) are met.
4 The impact of global advertising on the quality
of public policy
All societies have to deal with a certain set of political issues. That is, there is an
agenda of exogenously given problems to be solved. Let the size of this agenda be
normalised to one. Before voters can decide about how much to spend on each of
the topics on the political agenda, the government has to inform them about these
topics. Assuming that the cost of informing the public about a topic through the
media is equal to A0, we have for the tax cost of political information
t0 =
A0
rG
. (13)
For I = 1 and (13), the equilibrium values for the utility of the private and the
public sectors, which are determined by (11) and (12), reduce to
X = M
1
ρ
−1α(y − A0
rG
)ρ
c
, and
G = hβ(y − A0
rG
),
(14)
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respectively.
Moreover, expression (10) reduces to
M = (1− ρ)αrX
(
y
A0
− 1
rG
)
. (15)
According to the model presented in Section 2, economic integration means that the
size of the consumer population rises from rX < R to R. And political integration
increases the size of the voter population from rG < R to R. The quality of the
policy outcome depends on the time that voters have at their disposal for processing
the political information received. According to (6), for I = 1, this time is restricted
by the constraint
h = min {1, τ0 −M} . (16)
4.1 The case of the information-poor society
Let us first consider the effects of integration in an information-poor economy. In
this case, h = 1. According to (15), a larger market size rX increases the equilibrium
diversity of product variants for private consumption. As shown by (14), this raises
the utility that individuals draw from private consumption. In an information-poor
society, individuals’ exposure to a richer set of advertised private varieties does
not distract their attention from political information. For h = 1, the quality of
public policy and thus the utility drawn from the public sector are independent of
rX . Combining this with the gain in consumption utility, the conclusion must be
that international goods market integration is beneficial. Political integration also
is welfare enhancing. The reason is that a global government can distribute the
cost of political information over a larger population of taxpayers. This increases
12
households’ disposable income and augments both the utility drawn from the private
sector and the utility provided by the public sector.
4.2 The case of the information-rich society
However, things change if the economy is information rich, that is, if the diversity of
advertised private products exceeds the threshold τ0 − 1. As shown by (15), inter-
national integration itself may be responsible for making an economy information
rich.
According to (6), in a society with a public sector, M < τ0. Otherwise we would
have hI = 0.5 Moreover, in view of (16), τ0 < M + 1 if the society is information
rich. In sum, we have
τ0 − 1 < M < τ0. (17)
Combining (15) and M + h = τ0, we obtain for the quality of the public sector
h = τ0 − (1− ρ)αrX
(
y
A0
− 1
rG
)
. (18)
International integration, by increasing the diversity of the range of private products,
distracts individual attention from political information and thereby reduces the
quality of the solutions provided to public problems. This confirms the fear that the
agora is crowded out by the shopping mall. But does this diminish welfare?
Using (15) in X, we see that both economic and political integration are good
for the utility derived from the private sector. In contrast, they have negative
5In this case, the competition of firms for consumer attention drives advertising cost A up to a
point that brings M in line with attention capacity τ0. (See Falkinger, forthcoming, for an analysis
of this case.)
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effects on the utility derived from the public sector. Using (18) in G, we see that
economic integration definitely reduces G, whereas the effect of political integration
is ambiguous. The following proposition provides an answer to the question as to
whether the deterioration of policy in a population distracted by the shopping mall
is offset by the gains from trade, and whether political integration helps.
Proposition 1. In an information-rich economy: (i) For a given rG, economic in-
tegration increases welfare if and only if τ0
M
> 1+ βρ
α(1−ρ) . (ii) For a given rX , political
integration increases welfare if and only if τ0
M
> 1 + βρ
α(1−ρ)+ρ .
Proof: Appendix B.
The right side of the inequality conditions derived in Proposition 1 is declining in α
and 1/ρ and approaching one for α → 1 (i.e., β → 0) as well as for ρ → 0. Thus,
the first conclusion is that, all else being equal, international integration is benefi-
cial if both the weight of private consumption relative to public consumption and
the preference for variety in private goods are high. Second, for given preference
parameters, international integration is beneficial as long as the diversity of private
consumption is not too great. For M close to τ0, the left side of the inequality
conditions in Proposition 1 approaches one, so that integration is certainly harmful.
According to (15), apart from preferences, M is high if the society is rich or large.
Thus, the gains from globalisation are less certain in a rich or large society than in
a small or poor economy. The intuition for the result is as follows. International
integration increases the diversity of private consumption but also intensifies the
14
competition for attention since the scale economies of global information technolo-
gies can be exploited. This reduces the time dedicated to public issues and thus the
quality of the public sector. Now, in an economy in which the diversity of private
consumption is high anyway, a further increase in diversity through integration is
not important enough so as to outweigh the cost of policy deterioration.
The comparison of Parts (i) and (ii) of Proposition 1 leads to a further important
conclusion. Political integration (not accompanied by changes in economic integra-
tion) is more likely to increase welfare than is economic integration (not accompanied
by political integration). Put the other way round, political integration can help to
prevent the negative welfare effects of economic integration. For an economic intu-
ition, it is useful to look at the reaction of taxes to international integration. Using
(9) and (13), we obtain
g
rG
+ t0 = βy + α
A0
rG
. (19)
This shows an important difference between political and economic integration.
Political integration reduces the government share in per-capita income because
economies of scale in the distribution of political information are exploited. As we
have seen, this has similar effects to economic integration: Diversity of private con-
sumption rises and people’s attention shifts away from political information, which
lowers the quality of policy. But, in contrast to economic integration (not accompa-
nied by political integration), the lower quality of policy comes with a leaner state
and therefore hurts less. This result indicates that an interesting role is played by
the government share. The analysis in the following section will evidence this role
more clearly.
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5 The impact of globalisation on the diversity of
issues addressed by policy
Economic integration changes the diversity of products available to consumers. In an
analogous way, political integration can have an effect on the diversity of political
issues facing voters. We therefore now consider the case where I is endogenous,
while h is fixed to one. Moreover, we assume that the percentage of income spent
on political information is fixed. That is,
t0 = ty (20)
for some t, 0 < t < 1. In the previous section, the important advantage of political
over economic integration was that political integration reduced public spending.
Assumption (20) eliminates this asymmetry. Substituting (20) into (9), we have
gI = rGβ(1− t)y (21)
and thus gI/rG + t0 = [β + (1− β)t] y. Total public expenditure is proportional
to the aggregate income of the population covered by the political system. As a
consequence, the diversity of public goods is also proportional to the income and
size of the population covered by policy. Using (20) in (5), we have
I =
ty
A
rG. (22)
In an analogous way, we have for the diversity of private consumption
M =
(1− ρ)α(1− t)y
A
rX . (23)
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(Using (20) in (10).)
Because of h = 1, the attention constraint now reads
M + I ≤ τ0. (24)
Finally, with (20), the expressions (11) and (12) for the utility derived from private
and public consumption reduce to
X = M
1
ρ
−1α(1− t)yρ/c,
G = I
1
ϕ
−1β(1− t)y,
(25)
respectively.
5.1 Information-poor societies
A society is information poor if there is no scarcity of attention. That is, people
pay attention to all private or public items advertised with strength A0. According
to (22) and (23), this requires
(1− ρ)α(1− t)y
A0
rX +
ty
A0
rG ≤ τ0. (26)
If inequality (26) holds, then there is no competition for attention. No other firms
want to enter the advertising space and advertise additional items. Nor are there
free budgets for more political information. Thus, there is no upward pressure on
advertising strength and information costs stay at A0 per item. As a consequence,
both economic and political integration increase diversity since the scale economies
of global information can be exploited without crowding. According to (23), in a
larger market, the shopping mall presents consumers with a richer set of varieties
17
to choose from. This increases the utility drawn from the private sector, as shown
by (25). In the public sector, a larger population allows the promotion of a more
diverse political agenda if people have free capacity for processing information. This
increases the utility provided by the public sector because of the gains from diversity,
as in the private sector. This optimistic view on international integration has to be
qualified if inequality (26) does not hold, so that we are in an information-rich
society. International integration - with global information on products and politics
- is one important reason why attention capacity becomes binding. The others are
economic wealth and progress in information technologies - reflected by y/A0 in (26).
5.2 Information-rich societies
If inequality (26) does not hold, then competition for attention drives up advertising
strength. Expenditure A, required to bring an item to the attention of the popula-
tion, rises up to the point where the diversity of advertised items is brought in line
with perception constraint (24). In equilibrium, we have M + I = τ0, which implies
that
A
rX
=
yB
τ0
,
A
rG
=
yB
τ0r
, (27)
where B ≡ (1−ρ)α(1−t)+tr and r ≡ rG/rX . We see that now the relative ranges of
commercial and political information become crucial. Compared to autarky, where
rX = rG and thus r = 1, economic integration lowers r, whereas political integration
raises it. As a consequence, according to (27), economic integration increases the
per-capita cost of political information as compared with the information cost per
consumer in the private sector. Political integration has the opposite effect. This
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reflects the fact that having a broader range of information distribution creates
an advantage in the competition for attention. This advantage carries over to the
allocation of people’s attention for consumption and politics. Using (27) in (22) and
(23), we obtain
M =
τ0
1 + z(r)
, I =
τ0z(r)
1 + z(r)
, (28)
with z(r) ≡ t
(1−ρ)α(1−t)r.
This shows that economic integration (lowering r) increases the diversity of private
consumption - and thus, according to (25), the utility drawn from the private sector
- at the cost of a less diverse political agenda. This again confirms the view that the
international shopping mall crowds out the national political agenda. However, for
analogous reasons, political integration in economically isolated countries also has
a crowding effect. The political agenda is enlarged at the cost of private consump-
tion diversity. The following proposition presents the implications of international
integration for people’s welfare.
Proposition 2. Let r ≡ rG/rX . In an information-rich society that spends a share
t of income on political information, we have dU/dr > 0 if and only if M
I
> α(1/ρ−1)
β(1/ϕ−1) .
The latter condition is equivalent to t < β(1−ϕ)ρ
β(1−ϕ)ρ+ϕ ≡ t.
Proof. Appendix B.
This result points to a potential threat associated with globalisation which is ex-
actly the opposite of what common sense might suggest. Political integration may
be harmful, while economic integration without political integration can be a good
19
thing. The reason is the following. Political integration involves the risk that an
abundant international political agenda distracts attention from the marketplace.
Given a fixed budget share for information, the advantages of political information
are used for promoting a more diverse political agenda. If people are not very keen
on diversity in the public sector, this is wasteful. In contrast, economic integration
generates more advertisements for private goods and reduces the diversity of public
goods. At the same time, the expenditure allocated to any particular public good
rises.6
The proposition shows that apart from preference parameters, the share of total
income spent on political information matters. As long as this share is below the
threshold t, political integration is beneficial, while economic integration has a detri-
mental effect. Above this threshold, the welfare effects of political and economic
integration are inverted. The relevant threshold is rising in ρ and falling in ϕ. That
is, if the love for variety in private consumption is low or the love for variety in
public goods is high, then, all else being equal, the budget share for political infor-
mation can be high without risking harmful political integration. But if the love of
variety in the public sector is low relative to the private sector, then, for a given t,
the risk of harmful political integration is greater. This confirms the lesson learned
from Part (i). For additional economic intuition, it is worth our while to look at the
relative diversity of private and public goods. Part (ii) of Proposition 2 shows that
6This can be seen by substituting (22) and (27) into (21), which yields g = β(1−t)yBtr0 rX . It
is worth noting that this was different in the case considered in Section 4, where the size of the
political agenda was fixed. According to (19), in that case g = β(y−t0)rG+αA0. Thus, g increases
under political integration and is invariant to rX .
20
international integration is welfare increasing if it brings M/I into balance with the
preference parameters. Apart from love of variety, the weight of the private relative
to the public sector in the people’s utility function determines this balance. If in
an autarky (i.e., at r = 1) the political agenda is rich as compared with private
consumption diversity, then economic integration is required. If it is the other way
round, political integration is recommended in order to strengthen the public sector
in the competition for the people’s scarce attention. What happens if economic and
political integration take place pari passu? The answer is nothing as far as diversity
and utility is concerned. Since r remains equal to one, full integration is neutral
with respect to M and I, but also for X,G and U . The reason is that the gains
from integration are completely absorbed by the intensified competition for atten-
tion. Obviously, this raises the question of what would be optimal from a planner’s
point of view.
5.3 Globalisation in an information-rich society without waste
If there is no wasteful competition for attention, then A is fixed at A0. Thus, in
an information-rich society, in which M + I = τ0, the total information costs are
τ0A0. Suppose that the feasible range of information distribution is R ≤ R for both
commercial and political information. The disposable income (after provision for
information costs) is given by
y − τ0A0
R
≡ yn. (29)
The aggregate income constraint of the economy is
RcxM + gI = Ryn (30)
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and the utility of the representative agent amounts to
U = M
α
ρ xαI
β
ϕ (g/R)β.
The following proposition characterises the optimal program of a planner maximising
U – subject to income constraint (30) and attention constraint I +M = τ0.
Proposition 3. In an information-rich society of size R: (i) A social planner
chooses M∗ =
α( 1ρ−1)τ0
α( 1ρ−1)+β( 1ϕ−1)
, I∗ = τ0 − M∗ and x∗ = αyncM∗ , g∗ = βy
nR
I∗ . (ii) For
R < R, under the optimal program, welfare increases with R.
Proof. Appendix.
This shows that also under conditions of scarcity of attention, economic and polit-
ical integration are definitely a good thing if distortions from wasteful advertising
are avoided. Diversity of private consumption relative to diversity of public goods
is determined in such a way that people’s information-processing capacities are op-
timally brought in line with their preferences.7 And the gains from globalisation
are used to increase private and public consumption quantities rather than being
wasted in the competition for attention.8
6 Conclusion
This paper developed a two-sector equilibrium model with informative advertis-
ing about private and public goods. In equilibrium, the allocation of both the
7According to Part (i) of Proposition 3, M∗ and I∗ are invariant to changes in R.
8According to (29), net income rises with R. This in turn raises x∗ and g∗, which increases
welfare.
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information-processing capacities and the economic resources in the private and the
public sectors are determined simultaneously.
The utility derived from private consumption depends on the diversity of products
available. Likewise the utility provided by the public sector is related to the diver-
sity of public goods available. Moreover, the quality of policy can vary with the
amount of time that voters have at their disposal for processing political informa-
tion. The crucial assumption of the paper is that only items that are successfully
brought to people’s attention belong to their choice set, that is, the set of alternatives
between which individuals decide as consumers and citizens. Modern information
technologies and economic globalisation change the fundamentals of a society. Firms
can address consumers globally using advertisements that provide everybody with
knowledge about their products. This increases the exposure of people to infor-
mation and may also increase the effort required from both economic and political
agents to find a place on people’s agendas. Does this lead to a predatory competi-
tion of commerce versus policy?
The analysis presented here provided the following answers. Whereas in an information-
poor society – with no scarcity of attention – both economic and political integration
are beneficial, there is indeed evidence of tension between intensified commercial ad-
vertising and political agendas in an information-rich world.
Section 4 considered the case of the size of the political agenda being fixed, but voters
having more or less time for processing information about the political choices they
face. Economic globalisation without international political integration biases the
allocation of information capacities in favour of private consumption. This increases
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the diversity of the private goods consumed and reduces the quality of policy. As
a result, individuals lose as citizens and gain as consumers. However, on balance,
they may gain nonetheless. Gains are less likely in a rich and large economy than in
a small or poor economy. Political integration can also reduce welfare, though less
likely than economic integration. In other words, accompanying economic integra-
tion with political integration is a good thing if integration is beneficial at all. The
reason is that political integration allows exploitation of the scale effects of global
information technologies and leads to a leaner state.
Section 5 considered the case of the diversity of the political agenda being endoge-
nously adjusted, with the share of expenditure on political information relative to
total income being held constant. In this case, under scarcity of attention, globali-
sation leads to wasteful advertising. As a consequence, either political or economic
integration is beneficial, but never both. If the budget share for political informa-
tion is below a certain threshold, then economic integration increases the diversity
of private consumption at the cost of the diversity of the political agenda to such an
extent that welfare declines. In this situation, political integration is recommended
from a welfare point of view. If the budget share for political information is above
the threshold, then political integration is harmful. The rich international politi-
cal agenda crowds out the diversity of private consumption. Here, economic rather
than political integration is recommended. Full integration is neutral, as far as di-
versity and welfare are concerned. All the gains of globalisation are wasted in the
competition for people’s attention. Under a social planner who avoids this waste,
globalisation increases the quantities of private and public goods rather than their
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diversity. In this case, economic integration accompanied by political integration
then definitely also increases welfare in an information-rich world.
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A Appendix
Household behaviour: The first-order conditions for max
xs,gk
U are:
UXX
1−ρxρ−1s − λps = 0 (A1)
UGG
1−ϕgϕ−1k
(
qr−γG
)ϕ − λpG = 0, (A2)
where pG ≡ 1/rG and λ is the Lagrangean multiplier for the household’s budget
constraint. (Subscript notation is used for partial derivatives.)
Eliminating λ, we obtain from (A1), (A2)
Γ =
Gϕ
Xρ
g1−ϕk
x1−ρs
pG
ps
(
rγG
q
)ϕ
, (A3)
with Γ ≡ UGG
UXX
= β
α
.
Moreover, condition (A2) implies that gk = gk′ ≡ g for all k, k′ so that
G = I
1
ϕ gqr−γG . (A4)
Firm behaviour and free entry: According to (A1), consumer demand is isoelastic,
so that each monopolist sets
ps =
c
ρ
≡ pX (A5)
and xs = x for all s. Thus, the zero-profit condition rX(pX − c)x = A implies
pXx =
1
1− ρBX with BX ≡
A
rX
. (A6)
Moreover, X = M1/ρx becomes
X = M
1
ρ
ρ
(1− ρ)cBX (A7)
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under free entry.
Equilibrium: Using (A4) - (A6) and X = M
1
ρx in (A3), we have
Γ = (1− ρ) IgpG
MBX
. (A8)
Moreover, with (A6), the household’s budget constraint MpXx + IpGg + t0 = y
reduces to
M
BX
1− ρ + IpGg = y − t0. (A9)
Solving (A8) and (A9) for g and M , we obtain
g =
y − t0
IpG
Γ
1 + Γ
(A10)
M =
(1− ρ)(y − t0)
BX
1
1 + Γ
, (A11)
respectively.
In view of (A6) and (A11), the share of household income used for private consump-
tion is given by
pXMx
y
=
y − t0
y
1
1 + Γ
. (A12)
Moreover, using pG = 1/rG, (A10) and (A11) in (A4) and (A7), we have
G = I
1
ϕ
−1 (y − t0)Γqr1−γG
1 + Γ
(A13)
and
X =
ρ
c
(
1− ρ
BX
) 1
ρ
−1(
y − t0
1 + Γ
) 1
ρ
. (A14)
Finally, a balanced government budget requires
IpGg + t0 = I
g
rG
+ IBG, (A15)
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with BG ≡ A/rG. Since pG = 1/rG, this reduces to
IBG = t0. (A16)
28
B Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Substituting (11), (A13), I = 1, t0 = A0/rG and h = τ0−M
into U(X,G), we have
U = ξMα(
1
ρ
−1) (τ0 −M)β
(
y − A0
rG
)
, (B1)
with ξ ≡ (αρ/c)αββrβ(1−γ)G .
(i) Since ∂M/∂rX > 0,
dU
drX
R 0 if and only if α
(
1
ρ
− 1
)
(τ0 −M) R βM . This is
equivalent to τ0
M
− 1 R β
α( 1
ρ
−1) , which can be rewritten in the form
τ0
M
R 1 + βρ
α(1− ρ) . (B2)
(ii) For γ = 1, differentiation of (B1) with respect to rG gives us the condition
dU
drG
R 0 if and only if
{
α
(
1
ρ
− 1
)
(τ0 −M)− βM
}
∂M
∂rG
(
y − A0
rG
)
+M(τ0−M)A0r2G R 0,
where, according to (15), ∂M
∂rG
= (1−ρ)αrX 1r2G . (If γ < 1, there is an additional posi-
tive effect β(1−γ)U/rG.) Multiplying by r2G/A0 and using (1−ρ)αrX( yA0 − 1rG ) = M
from (15), we can rewrite the inequality condition in the form α
(
1
ρ
− 1
)
(τ0 −M)−
βM + (τ0 −M) R 0, which reduces to
(
τ0
M
− 1) (α(1−ρ)
ρ
+ 1
)
R β or
τ0
M
R 1 + βρ
α(1− ρ) + ρ. (B3)
QED.
Proof of Proposition 2. Substituting the expressions for X and G from (25) into U ,
we obtain
U = Mα(
1
ρ
−1)Iβ(
1
ϕ
−1) (1− t) y (αρ
c
)α
ββ.
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With (28), this reduces to
U = z(r)
β( 1ϕ−1)
[1+z(r)]
α( 1ρ−1)+β( 1ϕ−1)
D,
with D ≡ τα(
1
ρ
−1)+β( 1ϕ−1)
0 (1− t) y
(
αρ
c
)α
ββ.
Thus, dU
dr
R 0 if and only if β
(
1
ϕ
− 1
)
(1 + z) R
[
α
(
1
ρ
− 1
)
+ β
(
1
ϕ
− 1
)]
z. (Note
that dz/dr > 0.) This condition can be rewritten in the form
β
(
1
ϕ
− 1
)
R α
(
1
ρ
− 1
)
z. (B4)
Next, apply I/M = z(r) from (28). Then we can rewrite condition (B4) as M/I R
α(1/ρ−1)
β(1/ϕ−1) . This proves the first claim of the proposition.
For the second claim, note that in autarky, r = 1. Thus, z = t
(1−ρ)α(1−t) , according to
(28). Substituting this into (B4) and rearranging the terms, we obtain the condition
β(1− ϕ)ρ(1− t) R ϕt, which reduces to t R t. QED.
Proof of Proposition 3
Define yM ≡ cxM and yI ≡ gI/R. Then constraint (30) can be rewritten as
yM + yI = y
n, (B5)
whereas U takes the form
U = Mα(
1
ρ
−1)y
α
M
cα
Iβ(
1
ϕ
−1)yβI . (B6)
Maximising (B6) subject to (B5) with respect to yM , yI , we obtain
yM = αyn, yI = βyn. (B7)
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Furthermore, max
M,I
U subject to the attention constraint M + I = τ0 gives us the
first-order condition
α
(
1
ρ
− 1
)
I = β
(
1
ϕ
− 1
)
M. (B8)
Combining (B8) with (B7) and using the definitions of yM , yI , we obtain the solu-
tions for x, g,M and I presented in Part (i). For Part (ii), substitute the solutions
into U and use (29) for yn. Since yn increases in R, U is also increasing in R. QED.
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